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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
990 BRADY AVENUE, LLC 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) Civil Action File No. 2016CV272538 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
v. 
MICHAEL GIDEWON, THE 
GIDEWONS PROPERTY 
HOLDINGS, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT THE GIDEWONS PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant The Gidewons Property Holdings, Inc. 's 
Motion to Dismiss, or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Upon consideration of the briefs 
submitted on the Motion this Court finds as follows: 
I. Undisputed Facts in the Pleadings 
990 Brady Avenue, LLC ("990") leased a property located at 990 Brady A venue (the 
"Premises") to The Gidewons Property Holdings, Inc. ("Gidewons"). The Lease Agreement 
dated June 10,2009 (the "Lease"), was for a term of27 months, ending September 30, 2011, and 
included a right for Gidewons to purchase the Premises during the term of the Lease. The Lease 
required Gidewons as Tenant to "maintain in good order and repair the Premises" at his expense 
"throughout the initial term of this Lease, and any extension or renewal thereof." Further, the 
Lease states: 
9(a). Tenant shall not make any alterations, additions, or improvements to the 
Premises without Landlord's prior written consent, which shall not be 
unreasonably withheld, delayed, or conditioned. All approved alterations, 
additions, and improvements will be accomplished in a good and workmanlike 
manner, in conformity with all applicable laws and regulations .... 
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9(b). Landlord may require Tenant to remove any alterations, additions or 
improvements (whether or not made with Landlord's consent) at the termination 
of this Lease and to restore the Premises to its prior condition, all at Tenant's 
expense. All alterations, additions and improvements which Landlord has not 
required Tenant to remove shall become Landlord's property and shall be 
surrendered to Landlord upon the termination of this Lease .... 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Landlord shall give Tenant written notice, at time 
of Landlord consent, if such requested alterations will be required to be removed 
upon lease expiration." 
Gidewons did not purchase the Premises during the term of its Lease or during any of the five 
subsequent Lease Amendments extending the term of the Lease. The Fifth Lease Amendment 
extended the term of the Lease to March 31, 2016. However, 990 and Gidewons entered into a 
Termination Agreement on January 31,2016, terminating the Lease Agreement effective 
February 1,2016. The Termination Agreement further states that, "except as provided herein, 
upon execution of this Termination Agreement by the parties hereto, the Lease Agreement shall 
be terminated and neither party shall have any further obligations or liability to the other 
thereunder." The Lease, the five subsequent Lease Amendments, and the Termination 
Agreement are all Exhibits to the Verified Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief. 
During the term of the Lease Agreement, Gidewons admits that (1) a building on the 
Premises was removed and a new building constructed, (2) office space was built out in another 
building on the Premises, and (3) both power lines and sewer lines were run from the Premises to 
a neighboring property, 1008 Brady Avenue. The parties agree that Ronald Jacobs, 990's owner, 
was aware of all of these construction projects. I 
990 filed suit against Gidewons alleging breach of contract and breach of good faith and 
fair dealing, and seeking permanent injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and expenses of litigation. 
990 seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to remove the purportedly illegally constructed 
I 990 further alleges that the construction projects were undertaken without necessary City of Atlanta permits 
despite assurances at the time of construction to Jacobs that the projects were in compliance with all applicable 
codes and had the necessary permits. Gidewons denies these allegations. 
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building, office space, and underground powerlines from the Premises pursuant to the terms of 
the Lease. In response, Gidewons filed this Motion arguing that any liability for removal of 
additions, alterations, and improvements from the Premises were released under the express 
terms of the Termination Agreement. 
II. Standard of Review 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with 
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the 
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the 
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the 
framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a 
grant of the relief sought by the claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion 
to dismiss should be denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to 
be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding 
such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor. 
Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2) (1997) (citations omitted); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
12(b)(6). 
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when undisputed facts in the pleadings entitle the 
movant to judgment as a matter of law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c); Rolling Pin Kitchen 
Emporium, Inc. v. Kaas, 241 Ga. App. 577,577(2) (1999). "[A]U well-pleaded material [factual] 
allegations of the opposing party's pleading are to be taken as true, and all [factual] allegations of 
the moving party which have been denied are taken as false." Id. (citing Morgan v. Wachovia 
Bank, 237 Ga. App. 257, 258(2) (1999)). The Court may consider exhibits to the complaint or 
answer. Lapolla Indus. Inc. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256,258(2) (2013) (citations omitted). 
III. Analysis 
The Court finds the language of the Termination Agreement unambiguously releases any 
further obligations or liabilities that may have been owed by the parties under the Lease. 
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"Ambiguity exists where the words used in the contract leave the intent of the parties in 
question-i.e., that intent is uncertain, unclear, or is open to various interpretations." Coleman v. 
Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247,249(2) (2008) (citations omitted). 
"Conversely, no ambiguity exists where, examining the contract as a whole and affording the 
words used therein their plain and ordinary meaning, the contract is capable of only one 
reasonable interpretation." Id. "The existence or nonexistence of ambiguity in a contract is a 
question of law for the court." Id. 
Here, the language of the Termination Agreement is clear-neither party shall have "any 
further obligations or liability" under the Lease. There are no exclusions or exceptions listed. 
The Complaint seeks to impose liability on Gidewons arising directly from its obligations under 
the Lease. Thus, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Gidewons is entitled to judgment on the 
pleadings as a matter of law as the Termination Agreement unambiguously releases the parties 
from any Lease obligations or liabilities. 
990 argues the Court should convert this Motion to one for summary judgment and 
consider parol evidence as to the parties' intent. 990 argues that evidence will establish that the 
parties did not intend the language in the Termination Agreement to be a full release of any and 
all claims arising under the Lease but rather intended only to say that Gidewons was under no 
obligation to pay the last two months' rent? Generally, under Georgia law, "[t]he cardinal rule 
of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties." See O.C.G.A. § 13-2-3. "The 
language which the parties have used will be looked to for the purpose of finding that intention, 
which, when it is once ascertained, will prevail over all other considerations, in determining the 
21n support of this argument, 990 attaches the affidavits of Ronald Jacobs and Michael Gidewon, both of whom 
state that their intent when signing the Termination Agreement was only to waive Gidewons' obligation to pay the 
last month's rent. They argue that Gidewons' new owner, The Elle B. Group Properties, LLC, is attempting to 
expand the scope of the intended release in order to escape liability. However, the COUlt need not consider this 
extrinsic evidence as the language of the Termination Agreement is plain and unambiguous. 
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nature of the agreement." Goff v. Cooper, 110 Ga. App. 339,343(1) (1964) (citation omitted) 
(noting that "[0 ]nce this intent is clearly expressed by the parties we cannot read into the 
agreement contrary inferences"); see also Eckerd Corp. v. Alterman Props., Ltd., 264 Ga. App. 
72, 76(2) (2003) (noting the first step in the process to ascertain the parties' intent is to decide if 
the contract language is unambiguous, and if so the court enforces the contract's clear terms). 
"Although parol evidence as to the surrounding circumstances is admissible to explain 
ambiguities and to aid in the construction of contracts, it is not admissible to contradict or 
construe an unambiguous contract." Coleman, 294 Ga. App. at 249(2) (citations omitted). 
"Parol evidence is inadmissible to add to, take from, or vary a written contract." O.C.G.A. § 13- 
2-2(1). As noted above, the Termination Agreement is not ambiguous, and therefore the Court 
will not consider extrinsic or parol evidence of intention and instead follows the intention of the 
parties as unambiguously stated in the Termination Agreement. 
As such, Defendant The Gidewons Property Holdings, Inc. 's Motion for Judgement on 
the Pleadings is GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this ___!t_ day of June, 2016. 
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